Michael D.Heath-Caldwell M.Arch.

Naval Diary 1948  4

Tuesday 22 November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – 4 Seafires and 3 Fireflies were landed on today to be flown during the coming week by pilots undergoing deck landing training, either initial or for type of plane. The last plane down, a Firefly, hit the deck too heavily with a drift to Starboad and the strut of the Port undercarriage gave way under the tension. The plane came to rest on its Port wing and Starboard undercarriage just forward of the arrester wire control panel box.

Among the party of trainee pilots are 2 U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commanders who have come to learn to handle British aircraft by British methods. The purpose of their visit is to standardise American and British landing techniques so that should the necessity arise our pilots can land on their carriers and vice versa. Of course, at present, when most or our aircraft are not designed specifically for use on carriers and American planes are, the techniques used by the two navies must be different. For instance all American planes can land on from right astern because the pilots, in a high cockpit, can see the D.L.C.O. over the top of their engine cowlings, whereas our aircraft have to bank all the way in to land.

Monday 8^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – After spending Saturday and Sunday at anchor 3 miles from Invergordon off Cromarty the ship continued the D.L.T. and D.L.C.O. training programme with H.M.S. Ulster in company.

There was a low long swell today which made the ship pitch quite considerably, much more than any small fishing vessels which were in the vicinity. Due party to these conditions two planes crashed on the flight deck during the forenoon. One, which came down an the round down as the round down came up, leap frogged all the arrester wires and landed fairly and squarely in the middle of the first barrier.

The other plane’s Port undercarriage collapsed after a heavy landing, the plane finishing up in a precarious position perched on the hump of the Port crane. The pilot was not scratched luckily and nor was the crane. Had this not been the case storing ship at Rosyth on the day after next would have become a major problem with only one crane in use.

10^th – 13^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious

Amunitioning Ship at Rosyth

As soon as the ship was secured to a buoy at Rosyth at 0945 on Wednesday 10^th November 3 ammunition lighters, the Enfield, Catapult and Flintlock came alongside Port side. At the same time a water boat, with sacks of potatoes and greens on deck, came alongside under the Starboard crane.

The original plan for ammunitioning ship was to have all the lights alongside Port side; one by the Port after gangway lobby where ammunition was to have been hoisted inboard by whips and the lighter’s derrick; one under the Port crane, to be unloaded by the crane with the ammunition piled on trays; and the third lighter alongside the Port P.V.lobby to be unloaded by whips and the lighters derrick. To enable these boats to get alongside without hitting their superstructures or rigging on our ship’s side 3 large catamarans had been ordered from the dockyard. Unfortunately only two of the catamarans ordered came and one was secured under the Port crane while the other was placed under the Starboard crane. This effectively disorganised the programme. One lighter was sent away with orders to come back the next day. In the end it was only possible to start unloading the second lighter, Catapult, after the water boat had finished pumping and had been cleared of provisions.

One of the first minor difficulties that we were confronted with was the fact that the hooks on the slings used for the trays were too small to fit the eyebolts on the trays. This was put right when shackles were put on all the eyebolts. But this caused a short wastage of time whenever trays were hooked on, as very often the shackles were caught underneath the eyebolts.

Altogether 4,850 rounds of 4.5” ammunition, approximately 70% of the 4.5” ammunition in the lighters, and all the Pom Pom, Bofors and Mortar, in all amounting to 2978 cases, were hoisted onto the flight deck by 11 o’clock on Saturday 18^th. All the empty wound paper protective cases, in which every 4.5” round was packed, had to be hoisted back into the lighters together with 226 rounds of defective ammunition, most of which had had their cartridge cases dented prior to being hoisted onboard the ship. These defective rounds alone caused a wastage of 30 man hours, taking into account that each tray load had 60 rounds, that the turn round took 7 minutes, that the rounds had to be unpacked then repacked and hoisted down to the lighter and that 30 men were employed on the flight deck and lighter dealing with the 4.5” ammunition.

The third lighter caste off with 30% of the 4.5” ammunition, which should have been embarked, still onboard. All this could have been loaded onto the flight deck had there been more of a sense of urgency behind the operation or at least a definite target. As it was the hands, with the exception of the Royal Marines and Naval Air Trainees, did not work as enthusiastically and cheerfully as they might have done, had they known that ammunitioning was to have been completed  by stand easy on Saturday whatever happened. They might possibly have realised the urgency of the job if they had worked a little later in the dog watches, or even if they had worked through the lunch hours unloading the lighters as they did at tea time.

The hands who worked till 2355 on Saturday, striking down all the ammunition remaining on the flight deck to the magazine, worked exceptionally fast. And enthusiastically because they knew the reason why it was necessary to stow away the ammunition as quickly as possible. Because the weather outlook was by no means certain and it would have been very dangerous to have had a large quantity of ammunition loose on the flight deck if the ship had run into heavy seas.

[C.O. comment – I still find this disappointing. From your professional point of view the two most interesting events in the period covered were:-

(i) The rescue of Lt. Fanismit(?)

(ii) Securing to the buoy at Rosyth

You comment on neither.

The return of Mr Truman was a world event of interest and importance – no reference!

On the other hand there is a disproportionate amount of space devoted to the technicalities of night landings which do not concern you at all.

Signed (illegible) 19/11]

At 1400 on Saturday 13^th November the ship left Rosyth for her passage to Bangor, Northern Ireland. In the Irish Sea on Monday morning we ran into fog, nevertheless the rendezvous with H.M.S. Rapid off Bangor was affected without delay. The first ship that loomed out of the mist off Bangor was the Edinburgh Castle  of the Union Castle Line which was undergoing trials with a tug in assistance. [C.O. comment – attendance]

A Motor Fishing Vessel, which was sent from Greenock, and the ship’s boats ferried across the personnel and baggage of 815 Squadron from H.M.S. Rapid to H.M.S. Illustrious during the forenoon. All the baggage was hoisted inboard by the Starboard crane by 1215.

[C.O. comment – “X”] (see later)

During the afternoon the wind got up and at 1500 all the ship’s boats were hoisted and at 1530 sea dutymen were closed up in case it should have become necessary to weigh anchor in the event of the ship starting to drag. By 1600 the gale was blowing Force 8. The M.F.V. was unable to come out to the ship to bring off libertymen till Tuesday morning, having been sheltering from the storm all night. According to the Belfast Telegraph the Reverend J.B. Johnson, Port Chaplain, accommodated about 200 sailors in Hamilton Road Methodist Church, Bangor. For this he received a letter of thanks from the Captain.

At 2245 on Sunday Princess Elizabeth gave birth to a son. To celebrate this happy occasion a 21 gun salute was fired and the ship dressed with masthead flags at 1200 on Monday. We did not sound our siren for 5 minutes at 0900, as all other H.M. ships in harbour did, because we were still under way at that time. At 1730 in accordance with an A.G.M. the mainbrace was spliced. The Gunroom drank the young prince’s health in lime juice at dinner.

Tuesday 16^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – in the forenoon we landed on 12 Barracudas of 815 Squadron, which is the only squadron specially equipped with airborne radar for anti-submarine warfare. During the rest of the day two aircraft were used for Deck Landing Training.

Every day for the remainder of the week 815 Squadron was engaged in working up exercises. These included homing by Y.E.-Beacon, homing by direction from the Air Direction Room, homing by airborne radar and practice torpedo attacks were to have been made on Friday, but because the wind was too strong and gusty these exercises did not come off. [C.O. Comment – were cancelled.]

On Thursday evening we anchored in Brodick Bay on the East Coast of Arran, partly because it was sheltered from the West and partly because it was a better place than Bangor from which to start the next day’s flying, providing the wind did not back or veer more than 90º during the night.

Friday 19^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – the wind was blowing too hard for us to be able to fly off any Barracudas, gusting up to 45 knots at times. Eglinton reported that weather conditions were more favourable off Loch Foyle than further to the South so we went up there. During the afternoon 3 Barracudas and 2 Vampires were landed on but no aircraft at all were flown off for exercises.

Four destroyers, H.M.S. Crispin, H.M.S. Creole, H.M.S. Battleaxe and H.M.S. Scorpion overtook us to Port while we were proceeding West off the Giant’s Causeway near Portrush. These ships of the 4^th Escort Flotilla are operating from Londonderry at present, and were taking part in Anti-Submarine exercises organised by the School of Anti-Submarine Warfare at Londonderry.

On Thursday, while 815 Squadron was engaged in Air Exercises and I was in the Air Direction Room, H.M.S. Crispin and H.M.S.Creole were fuelled abeam for exercise. The operation with H.M.S.Creole was carried out the most efficiently because she came in close to our ship’s side and kept station well, thus making the job of transferring oiling hose from the flight deck to her focsle a simple operation.

[C.O. comment – A wholly inadequate comment – there were several points of interest in these two [?] one of which at any rate you would well have witnessed, and about both of which you should have enquired]

On Tuesday the consumption onboard of fresh water for washing and domestic purposes was 186 tons, which is 36 tons more water than the ship can distil in one day. The maximum capacity of the fresh water tanks is 280 tons, as they were at Rosyth. Thus if the rate at which water was consumed on Tuesday was to remain the same, in 7 ½ days there would be no water in the ship other than the water actually being produced by the 7 evaporators in the ship. To reduce the daily consumption of water all the ship’s company’s bathrooms up forward are closed during the hours when nobody should need to use them. These measures should at least bring the consumption of water down to a reasonable limit.

[C.O. comment – “X” – there were several points of seamanship interest on that day, and on the following Wednesday and Saturday – your remarks are empty and of no value. Sketch please.]

Communist Successes in China.

Mukdan, the key city of Manchuria has fallen to Chinese Communist forces: the fate of Suchow hangs in the balance with the Nationalist Government throwing in all its land and air forces into the battle to stem the Communist armies.

The Communists hold most of the known mineral wealth and industrial resources of China now that they are the undisputed masters of Manchuria. Whether they will be able to make as much use of these potentially rich territories as the Japanese did is doubtful because the Russians have been busy here – as they have been in overrun European countries – in removing factories and industrial equipment. Nevertheless, in spite of these disadvantages, the Chinese Communists now hold a very secure base from which they can advance against the Government held territories in North and Central China.

The Chinese Communist forces in China cannot be classed with the forces of Russia’s satellite countries in Europe, for the Russians have done little to help their Chinese comrades beyond allowing them to break into ex-Japanese arsenals in search of arms and munitions of war. Only a few Chinese leaders were trained in Soviet Russia and these, like Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, are not bent on completely subordinating China to Russia. The Communists owe their successes, not to a highly trained and organised minority, but to the general mass of the people, who have been persuaded that by co-operating with the Communists they will be supporting a system in which everybody with his own energies, will be able to raise the standard of life of the majority.

At present the Communist lead, Mao-Tse-Tung and his colleagues are trying to get the co-operation of anyone willing to work with them. For this reason they do not attempt to force public opinion into well defined channels, as the European Communists have been doing; instead they foster small businesses, industrial co-operatives and private enterprise. Because they have convinced the people that they have not gained their power by the age old Chinese methods of oppression, they still have the strength to hold their system together.

The greatest weakness of Chinese communism today is its exclusively agrarian outlook, which of course has been the reason why it has been supported so well by Chinese peasants. There is nothing at present to show how the Chinese Communists will be able to solve China’s problem of rehabilitation by solving the problems of her economy, industry, finance and above all her administration, the chief defect of which has always been its corruptness.

The Nanking Government, through not being able to maintain political or economic stability in the areas still under its control, has lost the confidence of all classes of the population with the exception of those who are still able to enrich themselves by corruption under the Government’s system. President Chiang Kai-shek’s policy, based mainly on half hearted American aid is another of the factors which does not inspire in his subjects confidence in his Government.

An American Mission from China calls for large scale aid to China at once to prevent the Communists dominating the whole of China and thus irreparably upsetting the balance of power in South East Asia and the Pacific. This could quite possibly lead to the same sort of a disaster as was caused by the Siamese Government’s pact of co-operation with the Japanese before America entered the last war.

The trend of events in China is more important today than it would have been in the past because we cannot rely so much on the support of Pakistan, India and the West Indies. Recent political change in these countries have tended to loosen their ties with the West  and of course with the English speaking countries of the Empire. Because of these factors it is most necessary to stop the present rot in China before it spreads to the other countries of the Far East.

[C.O. comment – Interesting – Sketch to illustrate position required. Not enough in itself for a week’s journal work]

Saturday 20^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – The duty boats were hoisted out at 0800, in spite of the fact that a gale warning for the area had been broadcast by the B.B.C. Between that time and 1000 the wind blew up and the sea became choppy so that it was decided to hoist all the boats. My boat had to lie off the starboard crane for about 10 minutes before the crane was trained outboard and the purchase lowered for us to hook on. During this time the pinnace, a much less seaworthy boat than the slow motor boat, was also lying off because it can only be hoisted once the motor boat has been lowered onto its crutches and traversed inboard. The pinnace was ordered to secure astern of the motor cutter at the port after boom in the ship’s lee.

Just after the motor boat had been hoisted the Port crane driver was piped to close up. The Starboard crane driver heard the pipe and immediately manned the Port crane thus holding up the hoisting of the pinnace further.

To prevent any of these delays in the future when boats have to be hoisted quickly a special routine has been promulgated. Everybody will be informed of what is happening by a pipe. The boats will be hoisted on the lee side of the ship if it is rough and Jumbo will be used to transfer the boats across the flight deck to their proper billets as necessary. If the weather is very bad the Engine Room Department will arrange to pump oil over the side forward of where the boats are being hoisted. To prevent any muddle about the duty crane driver all four duty crane drivers will close up at Port and Starboard cranes in an emergency.

Sunday 21^st November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – The ship weighed anchor at Bangor at 0700 as soon as the drifter, which had brought off the last stragglers, cast off. The weather was fine all day and the swell from the south was negligible.

Monday 22^nd November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – At 1730 the starboard watch closed up at 4.5” Defence stations for a night encounter exercise with H.M.S. Rapid. The first few rounds of starshell which we fired failed to burst. When eventually some shells did burst they burnt short and H.M.S. Rapid was not lit up by a continuous steady barrage of star shell.

The failure of the shoot was hard to diagnose. It was however suspected that either the fuzing machine on A1 gun was not functioning correctly or that the fuze setter was not setting the correct fuses.

[C.O. comment – Many other possibilities were considered e.g. Errors in elevation , wrong use of bubble, or incorrect fuze dials.]

Tuesday 28^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – During the night a gale blew up from the South East. All the hatches on the weather decks on the Port side of the ship had to be closed because of the seas. It also became necessary to traverse in the seaboat because it was being lifted up occasionally by the waves. One of the stanchions holding the pudding spar in the correct position was snapped off by the seas and the seaboat was holed on the starboard side.

In the morning the wind veered slightly and dropped a little. The seas also went down a little as we came into the lie of Cape Finnisterre although a long swell from the South West began at this time to affect the ship motion.

At 0045 when we went up on the flight deck for P.T. we noticed that the temperature had risen appreciably form the day before.

Wednesday 23^rd November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – The weather had improved so much by today that it was possible to continue working up 815 Squadron.

9 Barracudas were flown off at 0900 to carry out A.L.T.’s during the forenoon. In the afternoon more aircraft were flown off for a reconnaissance exercise. The main part of the exercise was to use an aircraft, orbiting 40 miles away, as an R/T link with the aircraft on patrol. The exercise was successful though it was found that the amount of talking over the aircraft frequencies was doubled unless the correct procedure was strictly adhered to. While the Barracudas were airborne one of the Vampires was flow off to keep the pilots up to the mark.

After sunset we carried out a second night encounter exercise with H.M.S. Rapid. Again the gunnery was rather erratic. One shell exploded prematurely as soon as it had left the barrel of the gun and burned in the sea on our Port beam for a few minutes, probably showing us as very well to H.M.S. Rapid. There was going to be a second run with starshell but this was abandoned.

Thursday 25^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – While some Barracuda aircraft were doing search exercises in the afternoon a Vampire successfully completed 26 landings. This brought the total of landings for that aircraft up to 100 and also completed the aircraft’s quota of deck landing trials.

Just before sunset the ship steamed from the west into Tangier Bay, turned round to starboard and passed close to the harbour wall and to the town. This was to raise the ship’s company’s morale, and certainly practically everybody in the ship who could come up onto the flight deck to hear the Commander’s commentary and see Africa did so.

[C.O. comment – [re ‘ship’s company’s morale) Almost as beastly a phrase as for propaganda purposes. Was it not done for interest, or even just for fun?]

As we steered out of Tangier Bay, westwards again to make to leeward for flying the next day, H.M.S. Rapid came up alongside starboard side to receive bread by light jackstay. The operation was completed after some initial delay because the light jackstay messenger was not correctly rigged. A heaving line was secured to the end of the light jackstay and outhaul instead of the 30 fathom length of 2 ½” rope. The result of this was that the coston gun line was not hauled right in by H.M.S. Rapid before the light jackstay was paid out from the flight deck. The whole weight of the light jackstay was taken by the coston gun line which parted. After that the hands working on the flight deck failed to check the light jackstay as it was pulled overboard by the weight of rope in the water. Before the operation could be attempted a second time the light jackstay had to be recovered which was not easy job.

[C.O. comment – re “no easy job.” – too time. (but was surely not very difficult!]

Friday 26^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – At 0900 4 Barracudas were flown off to make an attack on the ship and to be intercepted by the two Vampires.

At about the time when they should have been closing from the South West a closing aircraft was detected by radar to the S.S.W.  On the assumption that the aircraft was a Barracuda it height was calculated to be 10,000 ft as the echo received was a large one. The Vampires were flown off and climbed to 11,000ft and were directed towards the quarry. The target turned out to be a French Halifax aircraft flying much lower than 10,000ft, nevertheless the interception by the Vampires was successful and was the first interception of an aircraft by a directed jet fighter.

At 1700 the ship entered the North Entrance to Gibraltar Harbour and came alongside the South Mole. The head rope was secured without difficulty but the wind caught the ship’s stern and flew it off. 4 tugs however were standing by and these helped push the stern into the jetty. There was some delay after we had secured in getting in the after brow because the mobile crane on the jetty was not manoeuvrable enough and there were too many people at the starboard after gangway in the way of the hands working there.

Saturday to Tuesday 27^th – 30^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – Gibraltar – The hands were employed every day, including Sunday forenoon, in painting ship. This was most necessary as it as the first time for about ten weeks that we had the chance to employ large numbers of hands over the side and on the ship’s superstructure. Four large catamarans were provided by the dockyard with scaffolding mounted on top to facilitate the painting of our bows and stern. These were secured to a crane lighter just ahead of the ship and the seaboat was used to tow them into the right positions. The problem of handling these large chunks of wood was a difficult one. As it was we towed them alongside and ahead but I think it would have been simpler to have passed a line from the fo’c’scle to the catamarans first, then used the motor cutter for pushing the catamaran into the correct position. [C.O. comment – you try it!]

Oiling did not interrupt painting the ship’s side as we connect up to oiling points on the jetty.

H.M.S. Crossbow, H.M.S. Scorpion and H.M.S. Battleaxe secured astern of H.M.S. Rapid, just astern of us, on Sunday afternoon. These ships are here to take part in operation “Chichin” and the exercises carried out by the Home Fleet on its way back to England via the Azores.

[C.O. comment – You are a week astray]

Tuesday 30^th November 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – The ship was cast off from the South Mole at 1130 and turned round, assisted by two tugs, in the South End of the harbour and then left harbour by the South Entrance. The 4^th Escort Flotilla took station ahead in a screen.

During the afternoon watch, while the ship’s company was enjoying a well earned make and mend, the duty part prepared the rigging and oil fuel hose necessary for fuelling abeam.

At 1630 H.M.S. Battleaxe, H.M.S. Scorpion and H.M.S. Crossbow came alongside starboard side in succession and exercised oiling abeam by transferring the oil fuel hose across and connecting up to the destroyer’s hoses.

H.M.S. Battleaxe made a very spectacular approach from the starboard beam at high speed but did not turn to starboard quickly enough when she was close to the ship with the result that she came right alongside. She was so close that when she tried to put her bows out her stern swung in towards our ship’s side under the suction effect of our screws.  

Her port Stag gundeck in fact hit the gangway outboard of the ship’s company information room which luckily caused only a slight dent on our structure but which might quite easily have done considerable damage had her superstructure fouled ours elsewhere. The task of getting the hose onto H.M.S. Battleaxe’s fo’c’sle was made difficult at first, till Battelaxe opened out a little, as there was little room in which to work and the oil fuel hose, hanging from the crane is two long bights, threatened to become entangled in the destroyer’s foremast even though the crane was topped right up and not trained right outboard. The messenger on the end of the hose was (wove?) through a block on the forecastle so that the hands hauling on the end of the rope had plenty of deck on which to work without getting in the way of those actually engaged in connecting up the oil fuel hose. This was now done in the same way with the other two destroyers where the hands working the messenger were getting in the way of those securing the hose on ‘B’ gundeck.

H.M.S. Scorpion came alongside second, and having seen how close H.M.S. Battleaxe came, she kept station too far out from the ship’s side and didn’t seem to be able to close the correct revolutions for maintaining position.

H.M.S. Crossbow, the last to come alongside, probably profited from the mistakes of the other two. When astern the correct revolutions for maintaining station were found so that when she was alongside she reduced speed to the revolutions already known and from that time nobody appeared to bother to stand on the (pelorus?) all the time. She was also the correct distance away from the ship’s side where the compression and suction effects of the two ships making way through the water cancelled each other out. A short delay was caused by us for the first two coston gun lines missed ahead of the destroyer’s forecastle, for the ratings who aimed the rifles did not take into account the wind which was from astern, though a swell was coming from the West, from ahead.

The main reason why the evolutions were carried out rather slowly was lack of experience on the part of the destroyers. All the ships took too long in connecting up once they had the end of our hose inboard because, as is unfortunately the case quite often these day, the petty officers were trying to do all the pulley-hauley work themselves instead of directing the hands intelligently

[C.O. comment - √]

Wednesday 1^st December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – the atmosphere is still hot and humid in spite of our distance out to sea. This must be the result of the recent South to South Easterly winds which started to make themselves felt when we were in the Bay of Biscay on the way to Gibraltar.

During the day a dress rehearsal for ‘Operation Chicken’ was carried out. Flying stations sounded off at 0635 and at 0730 three aircraft were flown off to carry out a diverging track search, with one aircraft as an R/T link aircraft. The last aircraft, however, developed a high temperature in its radiator shortly after take off and was landing on again at once. H.M.S.Battleaxe and H.M.S. Crossbow were detached to act as a decoy, picket ships and search force. It the weather was going to be two bad for flying, Battleaxe and Crossbow were going to search for the enemy force instead of the aircraft.

Saturday 2^nd December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious

Exercise ‘Chicken’ Serial One

Attack on 2 Light Fleet Carriers and Destroyers by One Fleet Carrier and Destroyers.

Red Force                                            Blue Force

A.C.3 H.M.S. Vengeance                    S.O. H.M.S. Illustrious

H.M.S. Theseus                                   H.M.S. Rapid

D.4 Agincourt   *                                  D.6. H.M.S. Battleaxe ^

H.M.S. Alamein*                                  H.M.S. Crossbow ^

H.M.S. Corunna *                                H.M.S. Scorpion ^

H.M.S. Jutland *                                  H.M.S. Finisterre ^

(Possible) 50Firefly and Sea Fury Aircraft

(Possibly) 17 Barracuda, 2 Vampire Aircraft.

Battle Class Destroyer * Weapon Class Destroyer ^

At 0600 on Saturday Red Force was to be within 20miles of position SS(33º 55’N 29º 00’W) and Blue Force was supposed to be within 120 miles of RR (35º 15’N 31º 40’W). Red Force was supposed to be making for its base at Flores in the Azores so presumably it would have to be making good a Northerly course.

Blue Force’s task was to search for, locate and strike Red Force with Barracudas armed with bombs and torpedoes (for exercise) before Red Force had time to locate our force and attack us with superior numbers of aircraft, bombers and fighters.

We knew that when the Red Force left England on 23^rd September it had approximately 50 aircraft which could fly. We deduced that after two months operation in South Africa the number of serviceable aircraft might have been halved, so really the odds against us were not great, when taking into consideration the fact that they had 36 times the area to search for us as we had to search for them. Furthermore Barracuda aircraft are better suited for reconnaissance and search than Fireflies because they were designed for that job whereas Fireflies were designed as maids of all work and carried only 2 crew as opposed to 3 in a Barracuda. Thirdly 815 Squadron were equipped with radar sets for anti-submarine work, and having operated in conjunction with the Anti-Submarine School at Londonderry they were very experienced. One of the ship’s flight Barracudas was to be used as a VH/F R/T link between the Barracudas on patrol and the ship for passing enemy reports and messages in general.

Two destroyers , H.M.S. Battleaxe and H.M.S. Scorpion were to be detached form out force to act as decoys, H/F radio links with our aircraft if necessary and as picket ships if the enemy flew off an fighters, and lastly they were going to be used to search for and locate the enemy, with the other destroyers in Blue Force if the weather made the operation of aircraft impossible. If this was going to be the case we were going to sink the whole of Red Force by gunfire and torpedoes during a surface action for our destroyers outnumbered the enemy’s by one and H.M.S. Illustrious has 14 4.5” guns versus the Light  Fleet Carriers 40mm anti-submarine guns.

Exercise ‘Chicken’ – Serial I – What Happened.

At 0602 three search aircraft were flown off. They first flew to H.M.S. Battleaxe and H.M.S. Crossbow and started a diverging track search from that position. It was hoped that the enemy would track them in by radar and deduce our position as the point from which the tracks of our aircraft diverged. After that, if the Light Fleet Carriers had flown off any aircraft, H.M.S. Battleaxe and Crossbow would have been attacked, but if really realistic wartime conditions had prevailed we should have had a combat air patrol over these two destroyers for their protection.

The centre aircraft of the search spotted the enemy first but was unable to pass an enemy report. The two search planes shadowed the fleet and at 0721 a strike of 7 planes was flown off. These, however, missed the Red Force and passed to the West of the enemy, turned back and started a (sequence?) search, when they managed to locate the enemy and press home an attack with torpedoes (for exercise only).

Weather conditions were not favourable for operating aircraft because there was a long Atlantic swell running which was causing the flight deck to pitch a great deal. The Light Fleet Carriers decided that the weather was definitely not good enough for flying so we had no opposition in the air at all.

The operation went of according to plan from our point of view but faulty communications might possibly have wrecked our whole plan, for the first aircraft to spot the enemy was unable to pass a report owing to a defect in its transmitter. Had the second aircraft failed to see the fleet the strike could not have been flown off in such good time. Communications between search aircraft and H.M.S. Illustrious, and C-in-C Duke of York, could have been considerably improved if the aircraft had carried a V.H./F. transponder for relaying V.H/F. R/T. This set was being tested with H.M.S. Boxer in June of this year and might have been tested operationally during the exercise.

One Barracuda missed all the arrester wires when it landed and crashed into the barrier. The aircraft was struck down after some delay during which time some aircraft were kept waiting in the air. This delay would have been considerably shorter in wartime had it been considered dangerous to have the flight deck unusable for even a short time. Then the offending aircraft would have been quickly disposed of over the ship’s side. During the exercise the plane was struck down as quickly as possible, taking into account the fact that it was necessary to handle it carefully and to fold its wings before sending it down the after lift.

The exercise showed clearly the advantages a heavy and well armed aircraft carrier has over lighter carriers armed with much lighter weapons. The weather and swell were definitely the deciding factors of the defeat of Red Force. Possibly light fleet carriers would be better employed in landing air support for landing operations, where the ship could operate in relatively sheltered waters, than in protecting convoys out in the Atlantic Ocean during the season of the Autumn gales.

After ‘Operation Chicken’ Serial I H.M.S. Illustrious and the 4^th Escort Flotilla joined up with C-in-C and Red Force for a night encounter exercise. During the exercise the destroyers fired a great many star shells which landed first a little ahead of us but later astern of us because the destroyers had made an error in estimating our course and speed. We kept station 4 cables away from the Duke of York in line ahead. Station keeping was not easy using Radar Type 293 and the Captain said that continually having to pay attention to station keeping was a distraction when he had to appreciate the tactical situation. The answer is to attempt to cut down the ground wave effect when using 293, have type 268 installed onboard for close range navigation or alternatively not keep in such a close order during night operations.

Sunday 5^th December

H.M.S. Illustrious –

Replenishment of the Fleet in the Azores

The original intention was for all the ships to be replenished at sea, either from the aircraft carriers or the two oilers, Wave Sovereign and Wave Monarch.  Because of the swell running it was decided to being this replenishment operation in the lee of the Azores and what finally happened was that the oilers and the Duke of York anchored in the channel between the islands of Faial and Pico while the 3^rd Aircraft Carrier Squadron, H.M.S. Illustrious and the cruisers steamed up and down the channel between Pico and the Island of San Jorge.

We managed to transfer 180 tons of oil fuel to H.M.S. Rapid during the forenoon. We intended to give her 200 tons but the oil fuel hose parted twice, once in the middle of the evolution and once at the end.

Both times H.M.S. Rapid went out a little too far, the oil fuel line tautened out and the slings on the outer trough parted. The first time the outer slings on the trough parted and the crane purchase was so far out that the purchase drum was completely unwound and of course could not give any further. The armoured part of the hose parted at Rapid’s end causing an oil spout which blackened a large part of her bridge, funnel and the side of her forecastle. We connected up again to H.M.S. Rapid using the spare set of oiling gear and everything went well until the ships got a little too far apart once more and the ring holding the slings of the outer trough gave way under the strain. The weight of the hose was then taken by Rapid’s flexible metallic hose which parted, the copper strip trailed along in the water astern.

The use of a quick release oil hose coupling would have saved the hose and probably the filth on Rapid’s paintwork, not to mention the three ratings who were soaked from head to foot in oil fuel. It seemed off that the armoured hose should have parted in the first case when the wire jackstay was recovered intact. This may have been because the wire jackstay was not secured to H.M.S. Rapid at the time.

During the replenishment operations we were not the only ship to have trouble for H.M.S. Theseus also parted a hose when fuelling a destroyer.

Operation ‘Sunrise’ – War Between Red Land and Blue Land

Blue Land represented a country with strong air and submarine forces which were to try to shadow, attack and destroy us with atomic bombs; if weather permitted, before we, Red Force of Red Land managed to arrive within air striking distance of Plymouth. From the Azores to England we expected that there would be between 30 and 20 submarines lying in wait for us, listening in to A.C.H.Q. Devonport for reports from aircraft of our whereabouts. Our forces consisted of the two light fleet carriers, H.M.S. Theseus (A.C.3) and H.M.S. Vengeance, H.M.S. Duke of York (C-in-C), the cruisers  H.M.S. Diadem, H.M.S. Cleopatra and H.M.S. Sirius, escorted by the Battle class destroyers of the 4^th and 5^th Destroyer Flotillas and the weapon class anti-submarine destroyers of the 4^th Escort Flotilla.

On Tuesday and Wednesday 7^th and 8^th of December H.M.S. Illustrious operated 20 miles ahead of the main body as an advanced submarine hunting group. 10 miles ahead of us, and operating in conjunction with our Barracudas, was the 4^th Escort Flotilla. The swell from the West very nearly stopped us operating aircraft altogether, but 815 Squadron, with it experience and with the confidence it gained in itself during ‘Operation Chicken’ was operated during these two days without mishap. No submarines were (seen?) by the aircraft, however, because the state of the sea made a snort or periscope wake very inconspicuous indeed. The sea also prevented our radar from picking up any but close submarine echoes because of wave clutter.

Several shadowing aircraft were detected by our radar, and two of these were sighted and identified as Lincoln bombers of the R.A.F. We were only spotted twice by the enemy, who was unable to keep in touch with us all the time, because of 7/10 to 10/10 cloud and also because the number of planes that could be spared to take part in an operation of this sort was inadequate. It is reasonable to suppose that in wartime if an operation of this sort was being carried out the enemy would put a great many more aircraft into the air. Blue Force bombers were operating from Gibraltar, as we heard on the 1900 B.B.C. news bulletin, which accounted for the fact that nearly all aircraft were seen to close or track in from the South to South West. This fact had a first led us to suppose that half of the aircraft tracking North East were civilian airline aircraft.

Phase II. Thursday & Friday – Atomic Bomb Attack Imminent.

During Thursday shadow aircraft were busy searching for us all day. The aircraft should have sighted us at least half a dozen times because our ships reported engaging and identifying at least 6 different planes on different occasions, most of which were Lancasters. At 1800 the M.L.A. of the fleet was altered to nearly due North to throw off the aircraft shadowing. One aircraft reported our position 40 miles away from our real position which may have helped us. From 2000 on Thursday to 1030 on Friday the enemy did seem to have lost contact with us altogether.

At 0800 on Friday the M.L.A. was altered back to the East again but during the day we made little more than 100 miles to the East as we were more or less marking time. H.M.S. Vengeance flew off 2 Sea Furies for a C.A.P. during the forenoon. These were relieved at the same time as we flew off relief a/s patrols. At 1045 we flew off one Sea Vampire to show its paces to the fleet. Unfortunately the second Vampire was not able to be flown because it could not be started.

The Sea Furies intercepted one shadower successfully and reported, or claimed, to have shot it down. At 1500 when we had altered course into the wind to receive aircraft and relieve the a/s and C.A.P. patrols, one of the Sea Furies, revving up on H.M.S. Theseus’s deck, tipped up on its nose and became a crash on deck. H.M.S. Theseus did not fly off the relief C.A.P. and was unable to clear away the crashed aircraft quickly so we landed on her two Sea Furies.

Shadowers were in the vicinity of the fleet till 1600 but for 10 hours thereafter we were left in peace for the weather became steadily worse, a 45 knot gale blowing up from the South on our Starboard beam.

Saturday 28^th December – at 0310 on Saturday an aircraft made contact with the fleet and flew up and down, North and South for about half an hour. It dropped flares on the fleet, one of which was reported over H.M.S. Theseus. This attack, it turned out later, was made by a coastal command aircraft which dropped 3 flares tied together in a bundle to simulate the dummy atomic bomb. The photoflash bombs, which were intended for dropping on the fleet, were at an R.A.F. airfield in Norfolk at the time because Bomber Command reckoned the weather was too bad for attacking the fleet and had recalled all its aircraft.

Phase III: Intended attack by Aircraft Carrier Based Aircraft on Devonport.

The last part of the Exercise ‘Sunrise’ was abandoned because of unsuitable weather. At 0815 we were detached from the fleet and ordered to proceed independently.

Lessons Learnt and Faults Discovered During the Exercise.

As in Exercise ‘Chicken’ the advantage a heavy carrier has over lighter carriers was clearly demonstrated. The most striking instance was when we received H.M.S. Theseus’s 2 Sea Furies when she was unable to land them on. incidentally we should have operated aircraft of H.M.S. Theseus or Vengeance on Thursday if the [crossed out – light fleet carriers had been able to fly them] weather had been a little better, for although we were operating the Barracudas it was considered that our motion would have been too much for operating Sea Furies as we should have had to increase speed.

The action information organisation of the fleet was hampered by the fact that surface reports and air reports were being carried by one plot wave only. Plot Wave II was functioning perfectly well between the three aircraft carriers because it was used occasionally for heads of air departments of the three ships to talk to each other. Fleet wave, which should have been used solely for manoeuvring signals was used for some surface reports which was against all the rules. Plot wave II could have been used for air reporting between the ships, but I suppose the destroyers would have found it difficult to man both channels in these days of low ship’s complements.

The radar reporting from H.M.S. Illustrious showed up the differences of efficiency between Type 960 Air Warning Radar and Type 281 in the carriers H.M.S. Vengeance and Theseus and the cruisers. We managed to pick up regularly aircraft over 60 miles away, and very often we picked aircraft up to 90-100 miles range and tracked them out to 100 miles or more. The other ships usually detected aircraft when they were in to about 40 miles from the fleet. These detections did however apply to large bombers flying at heights of 5,000ft and over. Our own Barracuda, flying on A/S patrols at heights around 1000ft usually faded at a range of about 30-35 miles, sometimes less. The Duke of York’s Air Warning Radar seemed to be very poorly operated or giving poor results for several times we pointed out that she was reporting spurious echoes. When at night we had to rely on the Air Warning Radar sets of the other ships we had a very difficult job in plotting accurately the positions of aircraft within 30 miles of us, because the ship’s reporting the aircraft were widely separated. Again this would not have affected us during wartime as the sets would have been left operating all the time if the enemy was suspected of operating in the vicinity.

[C.O. comment – Unless radar silence except for guards were being enforced]

If in the future, larger aircraft carriers are built on the lines of a new American carrier under construction, without any Island above the flight deck and having about 6 accelerators instead of 1 or 2, it will become necessary to build ships like H.M.S. Boxer for operation with the fleet. A ship designed for the sole purpose of providing good air and surface radar coverage would undoubtedly operate its radar more efficiently than other ships because there would be no distractions from the ships main job. It would of course be necessary to design the ship for its job from the very word go for it would have to be capable of steaming at high speeds, both to keep up with a modern fleet, and for evasive action.

The R.A.F.’s part in Exercise ‘Sunrise.’

The fact that the R.A.F. was unable to effectively attack the Red Fleet, has shown up the air force’s weaknesses and seem to have caused consternation amongst the higher authorities. It is officially stated that the weather, rather than the Red Fleet itself, defeated the aircraft which tried to shadow and attack the ships. However, it is well known now that many bombers didn’t take off from their aerodromes as planned because of technical defects in their engines and their electrical equipment. It is said that these defects, which kept the aircraft grounded, were due to poor, or inadequate maintenance. The inadequate maintenance points to the fact that there are either too few well trained technicians tending the aircraft today, or the technicians are not well trained, or, worst of all, the technicians themselves have not the same pride in their work as in the fleet during the war. Pay is said to be one of the factors which has made many skilled air mechanics leave the R.A.F. and find better paid jobs elsewhere in the employment of civil firms.

In R.N. Squadrons the lack of trained personnel to keep the aircraft serviceable all the time is noticeable but those that do work, work with a will because they have the traditions of the Fleet Air Arm to maintain.

[C.O. Comment – Not bad. Your could with advantage be LARGER. Stick in or remove the pack of cards(?)]

Saturday 11^th December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – Having been detached from the Home Fleet in the Channel the ship proceeded northwards to attempt to fly off the 2 Vampires and 2 Sea Furies to R.N.A.S. Culdrose. Off the North Cornwall coast we were in the lee of the land and so we were not affected by the southerly swell which had been making us roll and pitch most of the night.

Although the weather was mainly sunny towards midday there were a few rain clouds about and conditions were showery. For this reason the two Sea Furies were flown off first to Culdrose to report on the weather that was encountered. From their information and from the general aspect of the weather over the land it was decided to keep the Vampires onboard. The jet plane’s chief disadvantage seems to be the fact that it cannot, as yet, be flown in as many weathers as the ‘propellor’ plane.

Sunday 12^th December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – At 0830 all the serviceable planes of 815 Squadron were flown off to Eglinton armed to the teeth with ‘rabbits and loot from Gibraltar.

At 0930 the ship anchored off Bangor and rendezvoused with the R.F.A. oiler Celerol and H.M.S. Rapid, which had preceded us North to refuel at Londonderry.

The tanker came alongside as soon as catamarans had been placed on our port side and H.M.S. Rapid came alongside her. While we were being oiled from the tanker the baggage and stores of 815 Squadron were transferred across via the tanker’s deck to the destroyer. This transfer of stores was followed by the transfer of all the personnel of 815 Squadron who were taken to Belfast and landed there.

All scientists, newspaper correspondents and technicians went ashore by boat at the first opportunity. It had been hoped to fly them off by 2 Avenger aircraft if the final phase of Operation ‘Sunrise’ had not been marred by bad weather.

Customs Officials came aboard as soon as we arrived and nobody was allowed to leave the ship until cleared by them. At 1500 we proceeded to sea once more on passage to Invergordon and the Customs had to leave us although they had not cleared everybody onboard.

Another attempt was made to fly the Vampires off as soon as we had weighed anchor but this time there was not enough wind. The ship’s speed on passage was 20 knots so that we could arrive of Invergordon early the next afternoon to land on the Fireflies and Sea Fires for deck landing training.

Monday 13^th December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – The weather during the forenoon was not particularly fine with cloudy conditions and a little rain and the wind started to get up blowing from the south. The wind, however, enabled us to fly off both Vampires at 1330 and they both reached Lossiemouth some 10 minutes later. One Barracuda was flown off, mainly I think to stretch its wings. One Midshipman went up with it to gain a little flying experience, at least he learned that Barracudas could loop the loop if he didn’t learn too much else.

At 1715 we anchored off Naime and embarked those officers and ratings who were to carry out deck landing training during the next week.

Tuesday 14^th  to Friday 17^th December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – Deck Landing Training Period.

Each day at 0730 the ship weighed anchor and proceeded to sea to get as far to leeward as possible by the time that it was light enough to fly aircraft. The largest number of landingts to be done were for Deck Landing Control Officers training. In all more than 400 of these landings were completed during the period.

When flying conditions were not too good the D.L.C.O. pilots, all most experienced airmen, did their landings. The trainees gained a great deal of confidence, I’m sure, seeing these men land their planes on the deck in safety time and time again.

On Thursday 2 Fireflies completed 30 landings between them in 25 minutes non-stop. Because of the speed at which we were competing the quota of landings our target was raised by an extra 120 which annoyed everybody because we thought that we should be able to set off back to Plymouth as soon as the original quota of landings was completed. Nevertheless on Friday we managed to keep up the tempo and so we did actually complete all the extra landings without any difficulty.

At 1600 on Friday the ship anchored off Cromarty and leave was granted to the Ship’s Company for the first time since we left Gibraltar.

The weather, which we expected would be cold, was actually much warmer than the last time we were here. The mountains over to the West have no snow on them as they did in early November.

Saturday 18^th to Tuesday 21^st December 1948

H.M.S. Illustrious – On Saturday we weighed anchor at Cromarty at 1145 and proceeded to sea.

As we went South the weather became colder and colder and at Devonport, where we arrived during Tuesday forenoon there was no improvement.

World Affairs.

China and the Far East.

During the last two months Communist armies have been steadily advancing into North and Central China. Resistance from the forces of the Kuomintang Government under Marshall Chiang Kaishek was considerable at first but since the surrender of Pekin and Tientsin nationalists commanders seem more inclined to come to terms with their adversaries. It seems possible that large number of government troops took advantage of offers of safe conduct if they surrendered their arms.

The Communists now have direct rail communications with Manchuria and their bases, and, with troops to spare from the Tientsin and Pekin area, it probably won’t be long before Shanghai, China’s most important sea port, and Nanking are occupied. If the Communists feel strong enough, after consolidating their gains in Central China, they will press onwards towards Canton and to the objective of uniting China under one rule once more.

The effect on the balance of power in the Pacific depends on the colour of the Chinese Communists. The Americans are inclined to believe that the Chinese are communist in name only, and will not be drawn into the spiders web of the Soviet Government. They hope that the Communists in China will quarrel between themselves once the enemy had been finally routed and that China’s power will once more be sapped by strife between new War Lords.

The outlook will be black indeed if Russia manages to step in once the bloodshed is over. Communist activity in Burma, Malaya and the East Indies would increase greatly once Communism was securely established in China for all the extremists could then expect outside help.

Australia’s position in the Far East has never been secure. The policy of excluding all coloured peoples from settling there had the effect of placing a very large vacuum, with a thin wall, in the centre of high pressure. Australia is under-populated by white people, because she cannot get as many immigrants as she would like, while the populations of most countries in the Far East are too large to be fed by the available means. Australia’s plight would be great indeed if the dominant power in the Pacific was not one of the Western Powers.

Palestine.

During the truce period between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, negotiated by the United Nations Mediator, the Jews re-equipped all their forces. The United Nations Organisation was unable to stop this misuse of the ceasefire because it had no international force at its disposal to enforce its decisions.

When the truce period began the Jews were in a bad position, having almost been driven back to the gates of Tel Aviv, their capital. They realised, however, how useful a truce would be to receive war material without interference from gun running ships and from transport planes, loaded with arms in Czechoslovakia.

The Arabs found themselves up against determined resistance before the truce began, and their advance was slowed down. This probably lowered the morale of the Arab fighters who had expected an early victory.

Before Christmas the Jewish forces, having already driven Lebanese troops out of North Palestine started an offensive against the Egyptians in the Negev. Beersheba and Gaza were soon captured but the Jews clamped down on all further news of fighting in the area.

Early in January the British delegate at the U.N. Assembly announced that Jewish forces were fighting in Egyptian territory.

Egypt did not ask for British aid under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, but British troops were sent to Akaba at the request of the Transjordan Government under the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty of 1948. This step was taken to forestall any Israelite attempts to size the port. The port installations were constructed early on in the war by New Zealand Engineers in case Egypt was lost and an alternative port of supply was needed.

While British troops were digging in at Akaba Jewish forces shot down five R.A.F. planes on reconnaissance flights over the fighting areas in Egypt. From all reports it appeared that our aircraft had flown over or very close to the Palestine border by mistake; that no high fighter cover had been provided; that our planes may have been mistaken for low flying Egyptian Spitfires; and lastly our aircraft were attacked by Messerschmitt 190G’s, whose performance compares favourably with that of the Spitfire.

Because of our weak position in the Middle East we were unable to take any retaliatory measures. The British Government was informed by the United Nations that the accident was the result of British interference. The Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv immediately too advantage of the situation by deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of our official complaints addressed to the Jewish authorities instead of the Jewish Government. Now, less than a month after the outrage, the British Government has had to recognise the Government of Israel.

On the Island of Rhodes Jewish and Egyptian delegates have been taking part in armistice talks. It appears that the Egyptians have been losers, for the Jews still have several thousand Egyptians surrounded in the Negev, whose fate will depend on the outcome of the peace negotiations.

The Ship in Dry Dock

On December 29^th the ship went into No.10 dry dock at Devonport.

This docking was not routine but had become necessary for repairs to be carried out on the port propellor shaft. During the three months at sea before Christmas the shaft had caused considerable vibration in the stern of the ship and the port palm compartment had developed a leak. This was not very important in itself, but because the compartment could not be pumped out the cause of the flooding could not be ascertained. It turned out that water entered the compartment where the ‘A’ bracket passed through the ship’s side.

The vibration of the shaft was due to the boring of the ‘A’ bracket woods with a tool which had drooped at the middle of the bore. Thus the shaft was rubbing the woods at the top in the middle, and at the bottom of the woods at the ends. This rubbing of the shaft had a large breaking affect which caused the vibration.

When the ship was docked down it was discovered that the eddy plates on the forward end of the Port ‘A’ bracket had been washed off, and the zinc strips on either side of the leading edge of the rudder were also missing. This gave a very striking illustration of the effectiveness of ‘zincs’ to prevent corrosion of steel near gun metal under water. All round the shaft there were pit holes, some ¼” deep, and the shaft was brand new last September. If the shaft continues to corrode it is probably that a new one will have to be fitted, only unfortunately there are at present no spare propellor shafts for aircraft carriers of our class.

Besides shaft trouble there was a leak into the fresh water tank under the capstan flat and canvas store forward. This had ben the cause of rather salty drinking water at times before Christmas.

Because our docking period was only one month the ship did not have to be de-ammunitioned before hand. All petrol compartments which had been filled with petrol had to be washed out and filled with fresh water before the dockyard would accept us for docking. Stores did not have to be landed at all before docking because the ship remained operational, in fact throughout the time we were in dock large quantities of stores were being embarked to enable the ship to proceed to sea as soon after undocking as possible.

The Berlin Air-Lift

The air freight carrying services to Berlin started on June 28^th after the Russians had closed all land communications between Berlin and the British and American Zones of Germany. The Russians’ aim was to force the Western Powers to evacuate their garrisons from Berlin so that a Russian controlled German Government could be set up in Berlin. Besides that the effect of a withdrawal from Berlin by the Western Powers would have been felt throughout Europe where we should have lost a great deal of prestige. At the beginning of Operation “Plain Fort,” as it was called, nobody thought that the service would have to continue indefinitely.

The maximum amount of supplies the airlift can carry into Berlin in one day depends on the most efficient running of the organisation at the receiving end. Theoretically Gatow airport can cope with 480 aircraft in 24 hours, or one landing every three minutes. The number is governed by a minimum interval between aircraft landings. The maximum number achieved in one day was 454 on Oct 17^th, 1948.

The problem is to direct aircraft, with different cruising speeds and flying at different heights from widely separated aerodromes, into the funnel of the Northern Corridor from Hamburg, so that they arrive over the Focknau Beacon, 16 miles from Berlin with an accuracy of +- 30 seconds from their E.T.A. The solution is provided by the use of a system in which each 24 hour period is divided into 6 blocks, 4 hours each, during which time each batch of aircraft does the round trip to Berlin.

Having arrived at the beacon from either the north or the south corridor the aircraft descend to 1,500ft and home on a further beacon to Berlin. The aircraft touch down at Gatow within 10 seconds of their E.T.A. If a pilot overshoots or arrives late he had to take his aircraft back to base and fly in to Berlin again with the next block.

In bad weather the time and space factors between aircraft are increased so that arrivals are at 4-5 minutes apart. G.C.A. comes into its own in poor visibility and has been used to cope with aircraft landing at six minute intervals.

The Air-Lift may be costing the Western  Powers a great deal of money but the experience gained in operating the routine service will be invaluable in a future war. R.A.F. aircrews and maintenance personnel have something definite to work for in keeping the Air-Lift operating to full efficiency and this is also paying dividends.

Last but not least the effect of the operations on the morale of the Germans, who live both in Berlin and under the air corridors, as well as on the Russian occupation forces must be for the good. No matter what propaganda is hurled at the Russian soldiers and German people the Air-Lift is something they all see every day and no lies can explain it away.